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At midnight on June 30, 1997, the. British colony of Hong Kong reverted to 
Chinese sovereignty and it became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the 
People's Republic of China. The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong 
Kong calls for maintaining Hong Kong's lifestyle and "high degree of autonomy" for fifty 
years after its transition to the Hong Kong SAR. The primary research question that this 
thesis will attempt to answer is: How has the concept of "high degree of autonomy" been 
operationalized since its inception in the "Joint Declaration of the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the 
People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong"? This thesis argues that 
during the period oftime from the signing of the Joint Declaration to the actual reversion 
to Chinese sovereignty the negotiations over the concept of Hong Kong's "high degree of 
autonomi' established the framework for the post-reversion way of life in Hong Kong. 
This thesis looks at this issue in three areas - the political arena, the security environment, 
and the economy. This thesis also examines the situation in Hong Kong one year after 
reversion and answers the question, "Has China lived up to its promises in these three 
realms of autonomy?" 
This period marks the start of a new political and economic experiment for China. 
. . 
China is attempting to regain the sovereignty of Hong Kong peacefully without 
disrupting its economic, social, and political systems under the framework of the Joint 
Declaration. The reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty will be a test of China's 
"one country, two systems" concept. 
v 
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At midnight on June 30, 1997, Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty. The 
territory's ISS-year history of British colonial rule ceased and it became a Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China. China refused to renew 
Britain's 99-year lease of the New Territories which expired in 1997. Negotiations 
between the British and Chinese, which began in 1982, led to Britain ceding all of the 
colony, not just the New Territories, to China under the condition that Hong Kong would 
become a Special Administrative Region of the PRC and as such would maintain its 
current way oflife after the reversion of sovereignty. The Sino-British Joint Declaration 
on the Question of Hong Kong, signed in 1984, calls for maintaining Hong Kong's 
lifestyle and "high degree of autonomy" for fifty' years after its transition to the Hong 
• I 
Kong Special Administrative Region. 
The primary research question that this thesis will attempt to answer is: How has 
the concept of "high degree of autonomy" been operationalized since its inception in the 
"Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
. . 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question 
of Hong Kong"? 
I hypothesi~e that both the British (Hong Kong) government and the Chinese 
government had different interpretations of the concept of~ong Kong's "high degree of 
autonomy." The Joint Declaration is purposefully vague in its definition o'fthis concept. 
Events which have taken place over the past thirteen years show how each side 
interpreted and politicized the notion of autonomy in Hong Kong. Not surprisingly, each 
ix 
side attempted to operationalize the concept to their own favor. The British colonial 
government attempted to carve out greater autonomy for Hong Kong before the reversion 
took place, and the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) attempted to 
limit that autonomy in order to have greater control from Beijing. This thesis argues that 
during the period of time from the signing of the Joint Declaration to the actual reversion 
to Chinese sovereignty the negotiations over the concept of Hong Kong's "high degree of 
autonomy" established the framework for the post-reversion way oflife in Hong Kong. 
This thesis looks at this issue in three areas - the political arena, the security 
environment, and the economy. I assess the indicators of impending change in these 
three realms based on the study of the actions of both sides since the Joint Declaration 
was signed . 
. Through democratic reforms, which took place in the Hong Kong goveinment 
from 1984 to just prior to reversion, Hong Kong in effect transferred some political 
power from the British colonial government to the people of Hong Kong. The 
government of the PRe reacted negatively to these changes and revised the entire 
political system after reversion. This thesis argues that it is unlikely that Hong Kong will 
maintain a "high degree of autonomy" in the political-arena in the coming years. 
This thesis then discusses the role of British troops and the Hong Kong police in 
security issues prior to reversion and how their roles and missions changed since 1984. 
This affects the role of the People's Liberation Army of the PRC in post-reversion Hong 
Kong. According to the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, the PLA is not to take a 
role in internal security .of Hong Kong .. In this case, the local Hong Kong government 
has managed to limit Beijing's control. There is, however, a clause in the Basic Law of 
x 
the Hong Kong SAR which allows the PLA to gain control of internal affairs in the event 
of "tunnoil" which "endangers national unity or security." This thesis argues that this 
clause may be used by the PRC to limit Hong Kong's autonomy in the security arena by 
allowing the PLA to take control of internal security. 
In the realm of the economy I will suggest that the PRC will not try to infringe 
upon too many central controls because it is in China's best interest for Hong Kong to 
maintain its current economic success. China promised to preserve Hong Kong's 
dynamic capitalist system. As Hong Kong's largest investor China has much to lose if 
Beijing infringes upon this autonomy. 
Finally, this thesis examines the situation in Hong Kong one year after reversion 
and answers the question, "Has China lived up to its promises in ~hese three realms of 
autonomy?" 
As we prepare to enter the 21st Century, the Asia-Pacific region occupies a 
prominent place in U. S. policy and strategy. The current steps toward imp~ovement in 
relations between China and the United States are dependent upon stability in the region. 
The reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty will be a test of China's "one 
. . 




At midnight on June 30, 1997, Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty. The 
territory's 155-year history of British colonial rule ceased and it became a Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China. 
It was widely held that there would be minimal changes in the Hong Kong system 
after reversion. After all, the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong 
Kong, signed in 1984, called for maintaining Hong Kong's lifestyle and ".high degree of 
autonomy" for fifty years after its transition to the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region. l Newspapers and magazines from all over the world reported China's promises 
to the people of Hong Kong regarding their future autonomy. 
The primary research question that this th,esis will attempt to answer is: How was 
the concept of "high degree of autonomy" operationalized since its inception in the "Joint 
Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the. Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong 
: Kong?" I hypothesize. that in the years leading ~p t? reversion both the British (Hong 
Kong) government and the Chinese government had different interpretations of the 
concept of Hong Kong's "high degree of autonomy." The 1984 Joint Declaration was 
purposefully vague in its definition of this concept. Events which have taken place over 
the past thirteen years show how each side has interpreted and politicized the notion of 
1 "Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong," 
[http://www.hongkong.org], October 5, 1996. Subsequent references to this document will be abbreviated 
to "Joint Declaration". 
autonomy in Hong Kong. Each side attempted to operationalize the concept to their own 
favor. The British-backed government of Hong Kong attempted to carve out greater 
autonomy as the reversion approached, and the government of the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) attempted to limit t,hat autonomy in order to have greater control from 
Beijing. 
This thesis argues that during the period of time from the inception of the Joint 
Declaration to the actual reversion'to Chinese sovereignty, the negotiations and give-and-
take over the concept of high degree of autonomy established the framework for the post-
reversion way of life in Hong Kong. The events which took place during this period of 
time reveal the way that autonomy might be compromised or upheld by Mainlanders in 
the years after the handover and in which areas. 
The Joint Declaration was signed on December 19, 1984. This document laid the 
foundation for the reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 1997. The 
Joint Declaration established that the Hong ~ong Special Administrative Region (SAR) 
of the PRC, the new name for the territory, would maintain Hong Kong's current high 
degree of autono~y and lifestyle for ·fifty years after the reversion. In accordance with 
the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR, promulgated by the 
National People's Congress ofthe Chinese Communist Party in 1990, stipulated the basic 
policies of the PRC.2 The Basic Law went "into effect on July 1, 1997~ and is to remain 
unchanged for fifty years. It provides the fundamental governing framework for 
2"The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China 
Adopted by the Seventh National People's Congress at its Third Session on 4 April 1990," 
[http://www.cityu.edu.hklBasicLaw]. October 5, 1996. Subsequent references to this document will be 
abbreviated to "Basic Law." 
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implementing the "one country, two systems" principle in Hong Kong which is consistent 
with China's commitments in the Joint Declaration. 
In the thirteen years since the signing of the Joint Declaration, both Hong Kong 
and China prepared for the reversion. Both the Chinese and the Hong Kong sides have 
changed the playing field, each attempting to carve out greater control as the transition 
approached. Both the local government of Hong Kong and the government of the PRC 
have pushed the boundaries of what "high degree of autonomy" actually means. Did 
Britain ever want Hong Kong to be truly autonomous? The highest ranking, most 
powerful figure in colonial Hong Kong, the Governor, had never been elected or even 
appointed in a democratic fashion. More likely the goal for Britain had been liberalism 
rather than democracy, independence from either Britain or China, and or full-scale 
"autonomy. " 
• f 
Over the past thirteen years, both sides have changed their stories about what they 
want. Suddenly it seems, since Governor Patten was appointed in July 1992, that the goal 
of the British was limited democracy for Hong Kong. Before his tenure, Hong Kong was 
. treated somewhat. dismissively by Britain when an opportunity existed to liber~lize the 
political system. The excuse)n the 1980's for blocking significant democratic reforms 
was that China would invade and/or destabilize the territory. There was little evidence 
for this, and Patten's reforms could easily have been promoted ten years earlier. The 
evidence that this could have been achieved peacefully is that the reforms in fact were 
promulgated in the past few years, but they may be too little, too late, and may end up 
being meaningless. 
3 
On the Chinese side, views on Hong Kong did not stabilize until after the 1989 
Tiananmen Massacre, when it became clear to everyone that Hong Kong was very 
different from Beijing, and would not be easily incorporated. Since then, Britain has 
been a champion of limited liberalism, the people of Hong Kong have become belatedly 
much more interested in their own autonomy, and Beijing has grown wary of any 
democratic reforms.. Developments in recent years suggest that China has grown more 
intolerant of true autonomy for Hong Kong. 
This thesis will analyze the implementation of the "autonomy" promised in the 
Joint Declaration in three areas - the political arena, the security environment, and the 
economy. I will assess the indicators of impending change in these three realms based on 
the study of the actions of both sides since the Joint Declaration was signed. Following 
. this introductory chapter, Chapter II will provide background information on the Joint 
Declaration and the Basic Law and the eyents which led to their promulgation. 
The next three chapters will be case studies of the three areas of autonomy noted 
above. They will track changes since 1984 and explain where the PRC and Hong Kong 
stood on the issues just prior to reversion.. ~hapter III will discuss democratic refol1lls 
which have taken place in the Hong Kong government since 1984 and China's reaction to 
them. Through these democratic reforms, the British in Hong Kong in effect transferred 
some political power from the colonial government to the people of Hong Kong. The 
government of the PRC reacted negatively to these changes and planned to revise the 
entire political system after reversion. Some of the PRC's announced plans are stipulated 
in the Basic Law while others are not. Maintaining a "high degree of autonomy" in the 
political arena does not seem likely. Chapter IV will discuss the autonomy Hong Kong 
4 
will maintain over security issues. I will discuss the role of the British troops and the 
Hong Kong police in security issues prior to reversion and how their roles and missions 
have changed since 1984. I will then discuss the expected future role of the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) in Hong Kong. According to the Joint Declaration and the Basic 
Law, the PLA is not to take a role in the internal security of Hong Kong. In this case, the 
local Hong Kong government has managed to limit Beijing's control. There is, however, 
a clause in the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR which allows the PLA to gain control 
of internal affairs in the event of "turmoil" which "endangers national unity or security." 
Chapter V will discuss the economic autonomy of Hong Kong in areas such as trade and. 
monetary policy. I conclude that the PRC will not try to infringe upon this autonomy 
because it is in China's best interest for Hong Kong to maintain its current economic 
success. 
Chapter VI will examine the implications of the events which have taken place 
since 1984 regarding the autonomy of Hong Kong. This thesis will conclude with a brief 
analysis of how this experiment of "one country, two systems" has fared one year after 
reverSIOn. 
As we prepare to enter the twenty-first century, the Asia-Pacific region occupies a 
prominent place in U. S. policy and strategy. The current steps toward improvement in 
relations between China and the United States are dependent upon stability in the region. 
The stability of Hong Kong is an extremely important issue economically for people all 
over the world. The reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty is a test of China's 
"one country, two systems" concept. The entire world will be watching to see how China 
5 
handles controversial transition issues and if she lives up to her commitments to and 
promises of autonomy to the people of Hong Kong. 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HONG KONG3 
During the Opium Wars with China in the nineteenth century, Britain used the 
territory as a naval base. At the end of the first Opium War in 1842, the Tr~aty of 
Nanking ceded the territory to Britain. Following additional conflicts with China in 
1860, Britain gained Kowloon and Stonecutter's Island. In 1898, Britain acquired the 
New Territories on a 99-year lease. During the 1910s and 1920s, Hong Kong served as a 
refuge for exiles from China following the establishment of the Chinese Republic in 
1912. After Japan seized Manchuria in 1932 and the Sino-Japanese war broke out in 
. 1938, China turned to Britain for supplies. As a result, relations between Britain, Hong·· 
Kong, and China improved. Throughout the ·late 1930s, as Japan advanced into China, 
hundreds of thousands of Chinese took refuge in Hong Kong. To defend against 
Japanese attack, Britain began to further strengthen the defense of the territories. On 
December 8, 1941, Japan~se aircraft bombed Kowloon, and Japanese troops pushed 
British defenders from Kowloon and the New Territories. On December 25, 1941, the 
. British army surrendered Hong Kong to the Japanese. Japanese plans to use Hong Kong 
as a staging area for assaults further into East Asia' were halted by the United States. 
Following Japan's surrender on August 14, 1945, Britain reclaimed the territory. 
3 Historical information is compiled from the following sources: Solomon Karrnel, Lecture, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 12, 1996; "East Asia In Cyberspace, " 
fhttp://Darkwing.uoregon.edu], October 5,1996; "Hong Kong Home Page, " [http://www.hongkong.org], 
October 5,1996; "Hong Kong Information Center," [http://www.info.gov.hk]. October 6,1996; and "The· 
Association for Asian Studies," [http://bbanning.memorial.indiana.edul-aas], October 15, 1996. 
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Following World War II, Hong Kong was again a major trade center. The Civil 
War in China and subsequent Communist victory in 1949 again led hundreds of 
thousands to flee to Hong Kong. After the 1950 U.S.-led ban on commerce with China, . 
Hong Kong's economic life temporarily suffered. The colony was forced to develop 
internal industries by taking advantage of local and regional resources in order to 
continue to grow. The constant influx from China of capital and manpower led to the 
establishment oflight manufacturing throughout the territory by the 1950s and 1960s. At 
the same time, Hong Kong's tax policies began to attract foreign investment further 
adding to the territory's rapid economic growth. The colony was again thrown into 
turmoil in 1967 as the Communists led riots throughout the spring and summer. The flow 
of refugees from China continued unabated throughout the late 1960s and into the 1970s. 
During the 1980s, the impending expiration of the New. Territories lease forced 
the United Kingdom to open negotiations with the PRC on the future of Hong Kong .. In 
1982, Britain and China entered into talks on the future of Hong Kong with the common 
goal of maintaining Hong Kong's stability and prosperity. Both sides recognized it would 
be impossible to maintain the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong if its territorial 
integrity were disturbed. 
Deng Xiaoping saw a golden, historic opportunity to reclaim China's legal right 
to Hong Kong. Beijing had made it clear that it did not recognize any of the treaties 
under which Britain had obtained Hong Kong in the nineteenth century. The PRC 
considered the agreements "unequal treaties" forced on a weakened Qing dynasty by the 
British through gunboat diplomacy. From China's perspective, the expir~tion of a treaty 
7 
it did not recognize seemed unimportant.4 Pressed to make a decision about renewing the 
treaty, Deng Xiaoping concluded that while he could tum a blind eye to continued British 
administration of Hong Kong, he could not formally extend British colonial rule over the 
territory.5 He therefore decided that China should reclaim Hong Kong. Prime Minister 
Thatcher realized that without a valid lease after 1997, the United Kingdom would be 
bound to return the leased lands to China without any agreement safeguarding the future 
of the territory. 
Initially the negotiation process was hampered by British and Chinese 
intransigence over the basic issues of sovereignty and future administration. The Chinese 
insisted upon two major points: that the sovereignty of Hong Kong belonged to China 
and that the expiration of the lease of the New Territories would mark the end of colonial 
rule not ·only in the leased territory but the entire· colony. The 'British maintained that 
sovereignty over the ceded territories of Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and Stonecutter's 
Island belonged to the United Kingdom, and that there was still a need for continued 
British rule for the good of the people.6 After several phases of negotiations, the British 
finally agreed to recognize China's position on sovereignty while China agreed to the 
basic framework of an agreement which would maintain Hong Kong's way of life and be 
legally binding.7 After two years of negotiations Britain and China reached an agreement 
4 Frank Ching, "Hong Kong: The Year Before Living Dangerously," Current History, September, 1996. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Derek Davies, "How Britain Fell for the Peking Gameplan," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 21, 
1984, pp. 44-45. 
7 "Howe Holds News Conference on Talks with PRC," FBIS China, August 1, 1984. Sir Geoffrey Howe 
was the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs at the' time of the negotiations. 
8 
on the future of Hong Kong, and the Prime Ministers of both countries signed the Sino-
British Joint Declaration on December 19, 1984.8 
Because of its economic value to China, Beijing sought to limit the impact of the 
change in sovereignty on Hong Kong. The Joint Declaration provided for the restoration 
of Hong Kong to the PRC and the establishment of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, the mechanism to ensure a smooth transfer of government in 
1997, and the continuation of Hong Kong's capitalist system and lifestyle for fifty years 
following the transfer. 9 
As a result of the negotiations, Beijing announced the concept of ':one country, 
two systems." Under this scheme, "Special Administrative Regions" could be established. 
that would allow systems and lifestyles different from those in mainland China; with the 
. idea of applying the formula to Taiwan .. After Britain stepped up efforts to resolve the 
Hong Kong issue, however, China decided to apply the formula of "one country, two 
systems" to Hong Kong first in the hope that Hong Kong would become a model for 
Taiwan. 
On July 1, 1997, amid much fanfare an.d ceremony, the territory became the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's'Republic of China and thus ending 
more than 150 years of British colonial rule. 
8 For more information on the history of Sino-British negotiations of the Joint Declaration see "Hong Kong 
Home Page," [http://www.hongkong.org], Oytober 5, 1996 and Charles Weston Cunningham, 
"Retrocession of Hong Kong," M.A. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1985. 
9 "JointDec1aration," Section 3. 
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B. HONG KONG rODAY 
By almost any standard, Hong Kong has one of the world's most successful 
economies. With a land area of only 420 square miles and a population of just 6.3 . 
million, Hong Kong is the world's eighth largest trading economy and a leading 
international financial center. Its airport is among the world's top five in both passenger 
and cargo volume, and its container port is the world's busiest. It has Asia's second 
largest stock market. More than 700 foreign companies maintain regional headquarters 
in Hong Kong, i~c1uding 85 of the world's top 100 banks. 10 
Ov~r the past two decades, the Hong Kong economy has more than quadrupled, 
and its per capita GDP has tripled to about $24,000 - higher than that of the United 
Kingdom, Canada, or Australia. Unemployment is only 3.2 percent, regular budget 
surpluses have produced a secure fiscal erivironment, and Hong Kong has accumulated 
over $58 billion in foreign exchange reserves. Hong Kong is one' of the safest cities in 
the world and is Asia's most popular travel destination with a record 10.2 million visitors 
in 1995. Hong Kong is also a center for telecommunications technology and has long 
been a media hub for Asia with over 700 newspapers and periodicals based there. I I 
Numbers, however, tell only part of the story. The reasons underlying Hong 
Kong's extraordinary success are significant as well. Hong Kong has one of the world's 
most liberal trade and investment regimes. Government regulation is transparent and 
nonburdensome. Taxes are low and the Hong Kong dollar is freely convertible. The 
IOWinston Lord, Assistant U.S. Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Hearing 
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 104th 
Congress, July 18, 1996. 
II ibi~. 
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workforce is educated, highly motivated, and industrious, and Hong Kong's pool of 
enterprising entrepreneurs is legendary. 
Other factors are more subtle, but they are no less compelling. Hong Kong people 
live and work within a trusted framework of law and justice - without economic, social, 
or political repression. Civil liberties and individual political, cultural, and academic 
freedoms are protected assiduously. The rule of law is well-established, and Hong Kong 
courts act as independent arbiters between the government and the governed. Freedom of 
expression is guaranteed, including the freedom to advocate changes of policy and 
practice without fear of government retribution. These factors along with the hard work 
of the' Hong Kong people have transformed Hong Kong into the thriving international 
entrepot it is today. 
C. THE JOINT DECLARATION AND BASIC LAW 
Hong Kong's status after reversion to Chinese sovereignty is defined in two 
documents: the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. Together, these documents 
enshrine China's promise that, although sovereignty changed in 1997, Hong Kong's way 
.of life will not 
The Joint Declaration provides that the post-reversion Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region is directly under the authority of the PRC central government. 
Under the Joint Declaration, unlike other regions of China, however, Hong Kong will 
retain a high degree of autonomy in all matters except foreign affairs and defense. The 
Joint Declaration establishes the concept of "one country, two systems" for Hong Kong, 
and guarantees that the social and economic systems, lifestyle, and rights and freedoms 
currently enjoyed by the Hong Kong ,people will remain unchanged for at least fifty 
11 
years. The Joint Declaration is an international agreement registered with the United 
Nations; it is the international legal foundation upon which Hong Kong's relations with 
the rest of the world will be based. 
On paper, the Joint Declaration establishes a framework that can, if honored and 
effectively implemented, assure that Hong Kong remains the vibrant and attractive place 
it is today. Among other things, the Joint Declaration provides that: 
• Hong Kong will have independent courts with ultimate judicial authority 
resting in a Court of Final Appeal 
• Hong Kong residents, not non-Hong Kong PRC citizens, will occupy all 
important government and civil service positions 
• Hong Kong laws, not PRC laws, will apply 
• Hong Kong's finances will be independent of China, and no tax revenues will 
be collected for or sent to Beijing . . 
• Hong Kong will continue to maintain its own currency and the Hong Kong 
dollar will be freely convertible 
• Hong Kong police, not the PLA, will maintain public order 
• Hong Kong will be empowered to enter into international agreements in a 
. wide range of areas 
• Hong Kong people will elect the legislature. 12 
The Joint Declaration states that the basic policies of the PRC regarding Hong 
Kong are to be stipulated in a Bas~c Law of the Hong Kong SAR enacted by the National 
People's Congress (NPC) and to remain unchanged for fifty years. The drafting of the 
Basic Law began in 1985. when the NPC appointed the Basic Law Drafting Committee 
(BLDC), comprising over fifty mainland and Hong Kong members. The Basic Law 
12 "Joint Declaration." 
12 
Consultative Committee (BLCC) of exclusive Hong Kong membership was set up to 
canvass the views of Hong Kong people. The first draft of the Basic Law was published 
in April 1988 followed by a five-month public consultation in which a large variety. of 
views were expressed. The second draft, endorsed by the Standing Committee of the 
NPC, reflected many of these views. The second consultation exercise ended in October 
1989. In December 1989 the BLDC reconvened to propose amendments to the second 
draft. The final draft was endorsed by the BLDC in its ninth plenary session in February . 
1990 and was enacted and promulgated by the NPC on April 4, 1990. The Basic Law 
was put into effect on July 1, 1997.13 
According to the BLDC the Basic Law provides the fundamental governing 
framework for implementing the "one country, two systems" principle in Hong Kong 
consistent with China's commitments in the Joint Declaration.· It says that the PRC 
socialist system and policies will not be extended to the territory.· The Basic Law 
reiterates the Joint Declaration promise to allow Hong Kong to exercise a high degree of 
autonomy and to exercise separate executive, legislative, and judicial power after 1997. 
This period marks the start of a new political and economic experiment for China 
and the world. China is attempting to regain the sovereignty of Hong Kong peacefully 
without disrupting its economic, social, and political systems under the framework 
established in the Joint Declaration. Deng Xiaoping's concept of "one country, two 
systems" fOTIns the basis by which the Chinese granted Hong Kong its guarantees in the 
13 For more information on the process by which the Basic Law was developed see "City University of 
Hong Kong," [http://www.cityu.edu.hkiBasicLaw]. October 5, 1996 and "Hong Kong Government 
Information Center," [http://www.info.gov.hk]. October 6, 1996. 
13 
Joint Declaration and explains the rationale for accepting the continuation of capitalism 
in post -1997 Hong Kong. 
The notion of autonomy as stated in the Joint Declaration is very vague. Through 
this document the People's Republic of China has made numerous promises to the people 
of Hong Kong. The Joint Declaration is not just an agreement but an international treaty 
which resolves three of the "Unequal Treaties" at the lowest social and political costs to 
China while promising to maintain Hong Kong's prosperity and stability. 
The PRC and Great Britain seem to have had differing views of what I;autonomy" 
means. Because of this, the Joint Declaration is intentionally vague on the issue. Three 
aspects of autonomy which will be presented here - political, security, and economic -
will make this vague notion more concrete. 
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II. THE POLITICAL ARENA 
This chapter will discuss the political system of Hong Kong and how the concept 
of "high degree of autonomy" affects it. What did this key phrase mean for the 
government of the PRC, and what did it mean to the Hong Kong. people? This chapter 
will examine the changes in the government of Hong Kong which took place from the 
signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984 until just prior to reversion. Will Hong Kong 
maintain its current lifestyle and "high degree of autonomy" as Beijing has promised? 
This chapter argues that this may'not be the case, at least not in a political sense. Based 
on recent actions by the PRC in regards to the Hong Kong political system, there is not 
even a guarantee of the Hong Kong people mainta~ning their current lifestyles as 
promised. , I 
A. THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT 
The pre-reversion government in Hong Kong was actually under the British 
colonial system. The principal features of the constitution of Hong Kong were prescribed 
in Letters Patent passed by Britain and provided for a Governor, an Executive ·Council 
(Exco) and a Legislative Council (Legco). The Executive Council, which was presided 
over by the Governor, consisted ofthr~e ex offielo and ten Governor-appointed members. 
The main function of the Executive Council was to advise the Governor. The Laws of 
Hong Kong were enacted by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Legislative 
Council, which also controlled public finance and monitored performance of the 
government through its Finance Committee and Public Accounts Committee.14 
14 "Hong Kong Government Information Center," [http://www.info.gov.hk]. October 6,1996. 
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The Legislative Council elections in September 1995 provided the first time all 
sixty members of the Legco were elected. Twenty were directly elected by the people of 
Hong Kong from geographical constituencies, thirty from functional constituencies 
representing major occupational and professional groups, and ten by an election 
committee comprised of all elected members of the district boards. The previous Legco 
elections in September 1991 included the first time that any seats were elected directly. 
The 1991 Legco consisted of twenty-one seats indirectly elected by functional 
constituencies, eighteen directly elected, eighteen appointed by the governor, and three ex 
officio members. IS 
B. DEMOCRATIC REFORMS? 
The Chinese government's recent rejection of democratic reforms in Hong Kong 
. is forthright, but it is hardly ground-breaking. Britain has been denying its colony self-
rule for ages. During the first 140 year~ of British control only one attempt was made to 
introduce representative rule. It was after WWII, and the idea was quashed by the local 
business elite whose successors· oppose democracy today. 16 
Britain returned to the notion of repre.sentative government for Hong Kong only 
after the Joint Declaration set a date for handing Hong Kong back to China. Confidence 
in the territory was fragile; so fragile that the promise of greater electoral participation 
was seen as one way of assuring a jittery population that the declaration's vague promise 
of a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong after 1997 actually meant something. The 
15 "Hong Kong Home Page," [http://www.hongkong.org], October 5,1996. 
16 "China's Gamble," Economist, June 22,1996. 
16 
responsible British minister, Sir Geoffrey Howe, promised the colony "a firmly based 
democratic administration." 17 
Steps towards this goal· were tentative. The pace of reform seemed to lag behind 
the people's appetite for it. A 1988 British white paper on political development in Hong 
Kong postponed the first ever direct elections to Legco, which would have decided a 
mere eighteen seats. The postponement was justified by survey results purporting to 
reflect public opinion on the matter, even though every other measure of public opinion 
confirmed a keen desire for faster reform. 18 
The Governor of Hong Kong at the time, Sir David Wilson, succumbed to PRC 
pressure for delaying these reforms. However, the 1989 massacre of civilians in Beijing, 
an event which sent confidence in. the colony plummeting, made it impossible to put 
things off forever. this incident ~ade it mU,ch more difficult for Britain, as well as 
China, to ignore the increasing frustrations and growing democratic inclinations of the 
Hong Kong people. In 1990 the British made political parties legal for the first time. In 
1991 the parties won the right to be represented in Legco, and pro-democratic candidates 
. 1 I· 19 won a sweepmg e ectora VIctOry. 
That did not necessarily mean that the Democratic Party won power over the 
government. The Legco was a body that could propose policy only with difficulty. 
Private members' bills were often thwarted by the British administration, which was also 
inclined to withdraw its own legislation rather than let the Legco amend it. Under the 
17 Sir Geoffrey Howe, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in 1984, as quoted 
in "Mother and Father Do Not Know Best," Economist, September 23, 1995. 
18 Ibid. 
19 "Hong Kong's Stormy Prospects," Economist, September 23, 1995. 
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British refonns, the Legco's role had been that of scrutineer, playing the part of a loyal 
opposition with no hope of ever winning executive power.20 
However, Chris Patten, who had been governor since 1992 until reversion, gave 
the Legco more authority. During his tenure he put through a package of democratic 
refonns to various tiers of government, much to China's irritation. However, 
administrative power was still held by Governor Patten's civil servants, advised by the 
Executive Council. The Exco acted as the governor's cabinet, and Patten kept it 
apolitical. No Legco member sat on it. Business interests predominated, and members 
were sworn not to divulge what their debates offered. 
Patten's attempt at institutional refonn proved insufficient to contain the 
democratic aspiration of the Hong Kong people, as rev~aled in the 1991 election. Martin 
Lee, the leader of Hong .KQng's Demo'cratic Party,an~ his followers wanted more 
refonns; for all Legco seats to be chosen by direct election; for the Chief Executive, as 
future governors would be called, to be elected by universal suffrage.21 
C. CHINA'S RESPONSE 
Governor. Patten pushed to the limit the scope of democratic chap.ges not 
specifically prohibited in the,Basic Law, but he did not give Hong Kong democracy, as 
he accepted the Chinese restriction that only one third of Hong Kong's legislators could 
be popularly elected from geographical constituencies. What Patten failed to realize was 
that the Chinese did not subscribe to the common law appmach in interpreting the Basic 
20 "Mother and Father Do Not Know Best". 
21 Martin Lee, "We Have To Be True to Our Principles, South China Morning Post, August 18, 1996. 
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Law.22 Chinese law is a complex amalgam of custom and statute and largely criminal 
law.23 In the Chinese legal tradition what is not specifically permitted by law is 
prohibited, Thus, the Chinese believe that Patten violated the Basic Law?4 China's 
leadership has not provided a very coherent version of what their disagreement with 
Patten's reforms was. 
Mistakenly believing he had reached a compromise acceptable to all, Patten tried 
to sell his modest proposals as a major democratic reform to the people of Hong Kong. 
The PRC leaders, already suspicIous of the British in general, and of Patten in particular, 
condemned the proposals.25 This made the people of Hong Kong, and the international 
media, feel that Patten's tiny step forward amounted to a major democratic reform. 
On March 24, 1996, the Preparatory Committee, which oversees the transition on 
behalf of China, voted to ~bolish Hong Kong's LegIslative Council and replace it with an 
appointed "Provisional" Legislature. The Provisional Legislature would act as Hong 
Kong's legislative body until such time as a new Legco could be chosen through 
elections whose much reduced element of participatory democracy met China's 
approval. 26 
22 "Basic Law." 
23 ''The World Fact Book 1995," [http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/95fact/], October 1, 1996. 
24 Steve Tsang, "Maximum Flexibility, Rigid Framework: China's Policy Towards Hong Kong and its 




In a September 1996 interview with a French newspaper, Jiang Zemin discussed 
China's policy on Hong Kong.27 He said that China's stand on the Hong Kong 
government issue is consistent. He said he believes that the establishment of the Legco at 
that time violated the Joint Declaration, the principles ·of convergence with the Basic 
Law, and the agreements and understanding reached between China and Britain. 
Therefore, it has become impossible to realize the Chinese government's original 
"through train" arrangement where all members of the last Legco of colonial Hong Kong 
could become members of the first Legco of the Hong Kong SAR. 
Sometime after July 1, 1997, the first Legislative Council of the Hong Kong SAR 
was to be formed in accordance with the NPC's decisions and provisions of the Basic 
Law. Jiang stated, 
The adoption of these measures will not harm Hong Kong's stability and 
prosperity, but will in fact help the stable transition of Hong Kong and the 
SARIs governmental operations. There will be a full guarantee for 
maintaining the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong after 
1997?8 
After China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong, Jiang said that it would follow the 
principle of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" and allow it a high degree of 
. . 
autonomy in accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.29 
With the "one country, two systems" principle, Hong Kong's capitalist social and 
27 "President Interviewed on Economy, Other Issues," Report by Xinhua News Agency of Jiang Zemin 




economic system and way of life, he promised, would remain unchanged and its laws 
would remain basically unchanged.3o 
In political terms, Hong Kong must justify its demand for greater democracy in . 
terms of utility to the PRC. The argument on the Hong Kong side is that democratic 
reforms in Hong Kong are essential for Hong Kong to sustain its economic dynamism in 
order to support the PRC's economy, and that without democratization Hong Kong's 
economy will collapse. However, the PRC leaders do not believe that Hong Kong's 
prosperity thus far is related to democracy. They oppose democratization in Hong Korig 
because of the potential demonstrative effect it could have for the rest of the country, 
which could pose a threat to the survival of the Communist party in mainland China in 
the long term.31 Jiang Zemin stressed, "Hong Kong's past prosperity cannot be attributed 
. to an independent judicial and a free press system as some people have suggested, but 
was mainly created by the Hong Kong people. Meanwhile, it is also due to inland 
China's support, refoim and opening up, and economic development. After Hong Kong's 
return to the mainland, the Hong Kong people will definitely create a more prosperous 
Hong Kong with a new mental outlook as mas.ters of the country. ,,32 
D. HONG KONG POST -REVERSION 
The Joint Declaration and the Basic Law are China's promise that, although 
sovereignty changed in 1997, Hong Kong's way of life would not. The Joint Declaration 
specifically provided that Hong Kong would have independent courts. and that Hong 
30 Ibid. 
31 Tsang. 
32 Jiang Zemin, Interview in Le Figaro. 
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Kong laws, not PRC laws., would apply. It states that Hong Kong residents would occupy 
all important government and civil service positions and that Hong Kong people would 
elect the legislature. 
On December 28, 1995, China approved the appointment of the Hong Kong SAR 
Preparatory Committee, whose members prepared for the post-1997 government that 
would run the SAR. Tycoons made up the majority of the ninety-four Hong Kong people 
appointed to the comniittee. Mainland officials made up the remaining fifty-six seats. 
The committee selected 400 Hong Kong people who were responsible for choosing a 
Chief Executive and Provisional Legislature. The Preparatory Committee laid out the 
criteria for the Selection Committee. The 400 members were to be drawn equally from 
four sectors, including commerce and industry, the professions, labor and grassroots 
organizations, and politics. Candidates for the.first three sectors. were submitted by their 
respective organizations for nomination. As for the political spots, twenty-six were 
reserved for Hong Kong deputies to the NPC, forty spots were reserved for former 
indigenous political figures and the remaining spots were for Hong Kong members of the 
National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. The 
Preparatory Committee stated that all members must support the "one country, two 
systems" principle.33 
Under the Basic Law, the new Chief Executive of Hong Kong was meant to be 
selected either by election or through consultations with people broadly representative of 
the territory's popUlation. The official race for the top job in Hong Kong began on 
33 "China's Preparatory Committee Lays Out Criteria· for Selection Committee," Agence France Presse, 
Augu~t 10, 1996. 
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August 15, 1996. Sir Ti Liang Yang, Hong Kong's Chief Justice, stepped down from his 
position to run for the office of Chief Executive.34 His main rival for this position was 
Tung Chee-hwa, a shipping magnate with strong backers in China. The consistent local 
favorite was Anson Chan, head of Hong Kong's civil service and deputy to Governor 
Chris Patten.35 The 400 member Selection Committee chose Tung Chee-Hwa as the 
candidate for Chief Executive by the end of November. The final decision ultimately 
was approved in Beijing in December. The Provisional Legislature membership was also 
announced in December, and they held their first plenary session in January 1997. Fully 
70 percent of the candidates and 85 percent of those eventually selected were themselves 
members of the 400-person Selection Committee appointed to choose the legislature. 
Thirty-three of the sixty members on the pre-reversion Legco were included in the new 
.chamber; but none of the nineteen seats held by the popular Democratic Party .in the 
. current Legco were represented in the Provisional Legislature.36 In effect, the 
Democratic Party's seats have been eliminated. Ten of the candidates in the new body 
had earlier lost on pro-China tickets in the 1995 elections. 
Pro-democracy groups say the Preparatory Committee, which selected the 
selectors for Chief Executive, is hardly representative of all Hong Kong. Most 
appointees have long had a cozy relationship with China's leaders, they say. Members of 
the Democratic Party, which won the most votes in the election last September were 
conspicuously absent from the committee. It is not surprising that Beijing did not appoint 
34 John Ridding, "Chief Justice in Fight For Top HK Job," Financial Times, September 4, 1996. 
35 Kevin Murphy, "Top Hong Kong Judge Seeks Executive Post; Candidacy Widens Unusual Race," 
International Herald Tribune, September 4, 1996. 
36 Bruce Gilley, "Tung Sets the Course, "Far Eastern Economic Review, January 9,1997, p 22. 
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any members of the Democratic Party to the ISO-member Preparatory Committee. 
However, it is somewhat hypocritical since it is supposed to be widely representative of 
the Hong Kong populations. Martin Lee, the leader of the Democratic Party, said, "The 
clear message is that China does not trust the people of Hong Kong. ,,37 In an act of 
dissent, the Democratic Party refused to submit party members' names to the Preparatory 
Committee for appointment to the Selection Committee. In an editorial to the South 
China Morning Post Lee wrote, "We cannot sign on to a blueprint for abolishing an 
elected legislature. That would be tantamount to sacrificing the end for the means." He 
added, "Taking part in the Selection Committee would confer legitimacy on an 
illegitimate process and would hopelessly compromise our ability to fight the Provisional 
Legislature. ,,38 
. . 
Opposition to the mere fact that there would be a new legislature began to fade as 
attention focused on what the Provisional Legislature was doing in its closed-door 
meetings in Shenzen in the months· prior to reversion.39 On its agenda was a new law on 
subversion to replace the one rushed through Hong Kong's sitting legislature by the 
British administration. London stalled for years over revising the draconian colonial . 
subversion laws, but whipped out a liberal version at the end of 1996 as soon as Beijing 
said that most criticism of China would be prohibited after 1997. The British version of 
37 "Turning Back the Clock in 1997," Economist, January 6, 1996. 
38 Lee. 
39 The Provisional Legislature had already begun to meet on the mainland by January, 1997. The PRC 
wanted the new Legco and the current Legco to work at the same time so as not to start fresh on 1 July. 
Any legislation passed by the Provisional Legislature went into effect on July 1, 1997. 
, . 
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the bill required the use of force to constitute subversion.4o It is likely to be replaced by a 
bill drawn up by the Provisional Legislature which will define subversion in line with 
China's state security regulations. These make the mere intent to overthrow the 
government a crime. 
The provisional body also considered striking down 38 laws or parts of laws 
deemed "inappropriate" after 1997 by a China-appointed legal pane1.41 Targeted were 
the colony's human-rights bill and most political reforms carried out since 1991. 
However, the Hong Kong Bar Association argues that all but five of the targeted laws 
conform with the Basic Law, and thus should be left intact.42 For example, commenting 
on the Electoral Provisions Ordinance and the Legislative Council (Electoral Provisions) 
Ordinance, laws which China has rejected, the Bar Association says, "We cannot see any 
basis on which the relevant provisions In thes.e two o~dihances ... could be considered to 
contravene the Basic Law.,,43 
In an appearance before the Selection Committee in November ~ 996, Tung 
acknowledged the fears in Hong Kong that his administration would be beholden to a 
mainland overlor~. He promised this·would not be the case.44 . Nonetheless, many Hong 
Kong residents are unsure ifhe will stand up for Hong Kong's autonomy due to his close 




43 Frank Ching, "Uphold Hong Kong Rule of Law, " Far Eastern Economic Review, April 3, 1997, P 30. 
44 "Hail to the Chief, "Far Eastern Economic Review, December 19, 1996, P 5. 
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E. HONG KONG'S PROSPECTS POST-1997 
Capitalist Hong Kong will be permitted to maintain the status quo for fifty years 
and enjoy a "high degree of autonomy,,45 provided this continues to be seen by the 
Chinese Communist leadership as economically beneficial and not harmful to its claim of 
sovereignty over the territory. The big task for China's leaders in the coming years is to 
adapt their political system to keep pace with economic change. China's leadership 
recognizes the need for a more federal system. They have promoted experiments with 
democratic reforms and decentralization in the mainland at the village level and might 
well see the value of Hong Kong as an experiment with the more liberal, decentralized 
politics that China needs. However, a crackdown against unpatriotic elements in Hong 
Kong would swing the political balance backwards. 
The world is watching to see how China handles the turnover. Many believe that 
. China will mishandle events badly. In particular, there are concerns that China will try to 
squash free speech.46 Faced with dissent in Hong Kong, the Chinese may react the way it 
has in the past: with repression. That could well lead to serious civil disorder in Hong 
.Kong to be played out before the eyes of the world's press. On the other hand, many 
businessmen take a different view. Some say that several Asian countries boomed 
without much political freedom, and what really matters to the people of Hong Kong is 
prosperity, and that need not be affected by political repression.47 
45 "Joint Declaration." 
46 "Can Hong Kong Stay Free?" Economist, June 22,1996. 
47 Ibid. 
26 
In June 1996, Lu Ping, the Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office 
of the State Council of China and the senior Chinese official responsible for the 
transition, told Japanese parliamentarians that no anti-PRC protests would be allowed in ' 
Hong Kong. The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 are classified in China as "counter-
revolutionary. ,,48 The same would presumably apply to any commemorations of that 
uprising in Hong Kong. 
The promises of Hong Kong maintaining its current way of life under Deng's 
"one country, two systems" concept apparently does not apply to all political freedoms. 
The formula "one country, two systems" was first devised by Deng Xiaoping not for 
Hong Kong, but for Taiwan. In the eyes of the Chinese leadership, if the formula works 
in Hong Kong, that would strengthen the attraction to the people of Taiwan. However, a 
corollary to this argument is that if China's condu,ct in Hong Kong revealed if to be a 
fraud, then hopes of a peaceful reunification with Taiwan would be destroyed.49 
Fears of China in the West and the rest of Asia would also intensify. That, in 
turn, would increase foreign hostility toward China, which is already finding that some of 
its international ambitions, such as member~hip in the World Trade Organization .and 
playing host to the Olympic Games, have been thwarted by foreigners' suspicion of it. 
Suspicion would tum to outright animosity if it cracked down on Hong Kong. However, 
a display of tolerance would help to defuse much of the wariness and hostility from the 
outside world. 
48 "China's Gamble," Economist, June 22, 1996. ' 
49 Lord. 
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The key question, of course, is whether China will honor its impressive set of 
commitments. The world does not yet know the answer. China has repeateq.ly stated its 
intention to stand by its pledges and preserve Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy. 
The international community, which has a substantial stake in Hong Kong, is watching 
and expecting this to happen. More important, the people of Hong Kong will make their 
own decisions about the future by primarily assessing the degree of sensitivity to local 
concerns Beijing brings to the important decisions it makes. For this reason, clear, 
positive signals from Beijing will be increasingly important to ensure Hong Kong's 
stability and prosperity under the Joint Declaration principles. In spite of the PRC 
leaders' verbal commitments to make a success of Hong Kong, there are nevertheless 
good reasons to doubt that their 1984 promises can ever become a reality. It should be 
recognized that the real purpose of the "one country, two systems." formula is to serve the 
interests of the PRC. 
Beijing has promised Hong Kong some autonomy as a separate political entity by 
approving Hong Kong's continued participation in international organizations and 
extension of most major multilateral agreements applied to Hong Kong through Britain. 
China also announced that all important Hong Kong Government positions would be 
filled by Hong Kong residents after 1997, thus allowing most senior civil servants to 
remain in place.5o This goes a long way toward Hong Kong maintaining its current way 
oflife. 
Unfortunately, Beijing has shown less understanding of the need to provide Hong 
Kong with the same high degree of autonomy in the electoral arena. Its approach to the 
50 "Hong Kong Civil Servants to Keep Jobs After 1997," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 29, 1994. 
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Legco has been particularly troubling. China rejected the British-backed electoral 
refonns as inconsistent with the Joint Declaration assurance that the "laws currently in 
force" in Hong Kong would remain unchanged.51 
Both British and Hong Kong Government officials have criticized China's 
decision as unjustified and unnecessary. They see it as a threat to· Hong Kong's future 
autonomy and its continued democratic development. They have challenged Beijing to 
describe how the Provisional Legislature is consistent with the Joint Declaration 
requirement of an elected legislature in Hong Kong. For its part, China has announced 
that the Provisional Legislature would last for no more than a year and that it would, in 
turn, be replaced in 1998 by an elected Legco, chosen on the basis of a new electoral law 
passed by the provisional body. China has said that a broad spectrum of candidates and 
parties would be allowed toparticip~te in the 1998 elections.52 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
Governor Chris Patten arrived in Hong Kong III 1992 to implement a more 
assertive British policy which was a departure from that of previous years. In this, he had 
the support of the colony's.liberals who wanted Britain to push China harder to see if. 
more democracy could be given to Hong Kong to safeguard its political autonomy. Four 
and a half years later, this policy has failed. Patten pushed China extremely hard, but 
failed to get any concessions. Patten believed he could' force China to accept his political 
refonn proposals, despite Chinese assertions from day one that if he went ahead 
unilaterally, whatever institution he set up would not last beyond June 30, 1997. 
51 "Joint Declaration." 
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With China's appointment of the first Chief Executive and the selection of the 
Provisional Legislature, Hong Kong entered the final stage of its transition to Chinese 
sovereignty. Hong Kong's economy remains healthy and strong. Most Hong Kong 
businessmen view the future positively and are less concerned with the uncertainties over 
political arrangements.53 
In the end, the answers to the questions surrounding the reversion lie primarily in 
Beijing. Recent Chinese actions suggest a lack of respect for, or lack of understanding 
of, the pillars on which the territory's success rests: the rule oflaw. lfthe rule oflaw is 
eroded, Hong Kong's future is in doubt. China set up a Provisional Legislative Council 
despite a virtual consensus in the Hong Kong legal community, including both the Hong 
Kong Bar Association and the Law Society, that this provisional body lacked a legal 
basis.54 The Basic Law sets, out in specific terms how the first legislature should be 
elected. China circumvented the Basic Law by calling the legislative body instated on 
July 1, 1997 a Provisional Legislature rather than the first legislature. 
Even more troubling is the fact that the NPC gave this body the authority to pass 
. laws before July 1, 1997, although the laws would not have gone into effect llntil that 
time. According to the Basic Law, bills were to be drafted and introduced by "the 
goverriment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. ,,55 Since there was no 
52 "Chinese Foreign Minister Addresses Hong Kong Preparatory Committee," Xinhua News Agency in 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 12, 1996. ' 
53 "Hong Kong Businessmen Prepare for Chinese Rule," Cable News Network Transcript # 924-6, July 31, 
1996. 
54 Chin g. 
55 "Basic Law," Article 62. 
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such thing as the Hong Kong SAR until July 1, 1997, the passing of laws by the 
Provisional Legislature could hardly be in accordance with the Basic Law. 
During an NPC session shortly before reversion, the Chinese also announced that 
several of Hong Kong's laws would not be adopted as laws of the Hong Kong SAR on 
the grounds that they were not consistent with the Basic Law. Many of these, including 
Patten's electoral refonn laws were not obviously inconsistent with the Hong Kong 
SAR's constitution. The PRC has not been specific on what the inconsistencies are. The 
Hong Kong Bar Association questions China's decisions on many of these laws. 
Unless the NPC gives reasons for its actions, the impression will grow in Hong 
Kong that the law is whatever Beijing says it is. This type of thinking could threaten the 
political stability in Hong Kong. It is critical that Beijing adhere to its commitment to 
preserve Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy. 
31 
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III. THE SECURITY ARENA 
Beijing's commitment to Hong Kong's autonomy in the political arena does not· 
look promising. The Joint Declaration also calls for Hong Kong maintaining autonomy 
in the realm of internal security. The Joint Declaration and Basic Law offer few specifics 
on the defense and security of Hong Kong after reversion. Over the past thirteen years, 
however, both the Chinese and the Hong Kong sides have each attempted to carve out 
greater autonomy in the realm of security as the transition approached. This chapter will 
examine the issue of Hong Kong's autonomy in the area of security. It will give a brief 
background regarding the British garrison stationed there prior to the turnover. It will 
discuss the planned role of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA)' troops in the SAR. 
This chapter will elaborate on the controversies regarding the turnover of duties from the 
British to the Chinese and attempt to explain the perceptions of the Hong Kong people on 
the issues surrounding security autonomy. 
The Basic Law provides the fundamental governing framework for implementing 
the "one country, two systems" principle in Hong Kong consistent with China's 
commitments in the Joint Declaration. It says that the PRC socialist system and policies 
will not be extended to the territory. 
On the issue of defense, the Joint Declaration states: 
The maintenance of public order in the Hong Kong SAR shall be the 
responsibility of the Hong Kong SAR Government. Military forces sent 
by the Central People's Government to be stationed in the Hong Kong 
SAR for the purpose of defense shall not interfere in the internal affairs of 
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the Hong Kong SAR. Expenditure for these military forces shall be borne 
by the Central People's Government. 56 
Ji Pengfei, Chairman of the Drafting Committee for the Basic Law, addressed the 
National People's Congress with explanations on the Hong Kong SAR's mini-
constitution. He explained that the Central People's Government would be responsible 
for the Special Administrative Region's defense and foreign affairs. However, in· the 
event that the National People's Congress Standing Committee decides to declare a state 
of war or, "by reason of turmoil within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
which endangers national unity or security and is beyond the control· of the Special 
Administrative Region Government, decides that the Region is in a state of emergency," 
the Central People's Government may issue an order applying the relevant national laws 
in Hong Kong.5,7 Under tp.e constitution prepared .by China to govern Hong Kong after 
1997, the Chinese garrison would be barred from interfering in the territory's affairs, 
although it could be used to maintain public order and help with disaster relief when 
Hong Kong asked. 
A. THE BRITISH GARRISON 
The UK armed forces were at their peak jn Hong Kong around the time of the 
Korean War (1950-53) with about 30,000 troops in two brigade groups and a carrier air 
group. Prior to reversion there were 3,250 left. In June, 1997, by the time PLA arrived, 
56 "Joint Declaration, Annex I, Elaboration by the Government of the People's Republic of China of its 
Basic Policies Regarding Hong Kong," Section XII, December 19, 1984. 
57 Ji Pengfei, "Explanations on ''The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People's Republic of China' and its Related Documents," addressing the Third Session of the Seventh 
National People's Congress, March 28, 1990 from the Propaganda Department Xinhua News Agency 
(Hong Kong Branch). 'The entire text of the Basic Law, along with other official releases from the PRC 
government may be viewed at "City University of Hong Kong, Basic Law," 
[http://www.cityu.edu.hkiBasicLaw ]. 
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only 400 or so British military personnel were left on the island where the British Royal 
Navy first raised its ensign in 1841. 
That the UK armed forces still had a presence in Hong Kong at all is due to two 
factors. First, they were a visible presence in underwriting the sovereignty of the UK 
until reversion to China. Second, they were there to assist the Hong Kong police, if need 
be. They had not filled a typical defense role for quite some time. The military h,ad for 
years kept a low profile in the world's glittering, high rise capital of free enterprise where 
internal security is an internal matter. It had long been accepted that strategically Hong 
Kong meant nothing to Britain any more. 58 
The British army had steadily reduced its role in the area since the mid-1980s. In 
the past, UK forces provided logistic support for controlling Hong Kong's population of 
, ' 
Vietnamese boat.people. They were further involved in anti-smuggling activities, search 
and rescue operations and disaster relief A principal mission in recent years had been to 
guard the border against illegal immigrants. These functions have now devolved to the 
Hong Kong police, a 33,000-strong paramilitary force equipped with riot-control vehicles 
and specially-trained companies of riot officers. 
The British troops no longer patrolled the 26-mile cordon of fences and razor-wire 
separating the New Territories on the mainland from China proper. That task also had 
been assigned to the Hong Kong police. The expansion of the police force was no 
accident. It seems apparent that Britain ceded responsibility to the Hong Kong 
government to deny the PLA the excuse of a high-profile presence in the colony after 
1997. Beijing can no longer claim that its troops would be carrying on the work of the 
58 Conor O'Clery, The Irish Times, October 2, 1996, P 10, 
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UK armed forces as a counter to possible civil unrest. That has become a civil function, 
enshrined in a decade of custom and practice. Hong Kong is, as a result, the second most 
heavily-policed city in the world after Tokyo.59 
B. THE PLA GARRISON 
On January 28, 1996, the State Council and the Central Military Commission 
(CMC) announced the creation of the Hong Kong Garrison of the People's Liberation 
Anny. According to the announcement, the mission of the garrison was to safeguard "the 
sovereignty, unification, and the territorial integrity of the state, and maintain the 
prosperity and stability of the· Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. ,,60 In 
accordance with the Joint Declaration, the garrison was not to be used for internal 
security. This ties in with PRC promises to maintain .Hong Kong's way of life and to 
grant it a high degree of autonqmy. 
The Hong Kong garrison is a combined force of selected naval, ground and air 
force units. The ga.riison force includes an infantry brigade, a naval unit, and an air force 
corps. The total force stands at about 20,000, including troops stationed at logistic bases 
located on the mainland and the reserve force for relief duty. 61 
The Hong Kong garri~on is based on an army-level establishment, thus giving it 
the status of a provincial military district. While administratively it is subordinate to the 
Guangzhou Military Region, the garrison is also under the direct command of the CMC 
because of Hong Kong's special status. 
59 Ian Bruce, "Farewell to the Foreign Devils," Herald (Glasgow), December 7,1996, P 12. 




The commander of the garrison is Major General Liu Zhenwu. He is supported 
by two deputy commanders: Colonel Zhou Borong and Colonel Yuan Shijun. The 
fonner is regarded as a very prominent officer who would play an important role as a 
liaison with the British and foreign military forces. 62 The political wing of the garrison is 
headed by political commissar Major General Xiong Ziren. Prior to the transition, 
although the PLA refused to detail plans for the size and composition of its garrison after 
British withdrawal, Beijing had previously indicated that its garrison would be of similar 
size to that of Britain's before the reduction of forces began a few years ago.63 · 
The PLA Navy is provided with a deep water berth facility on Stonecutter's· 
Island, but the Chinese have no reason to use Hong Kong as a major, strategic naval 
base.64 They have adequate strategic bases on their existing coastline to cover likely 
trouble spots such as the Spratly islands and Taiwan.· Also, the massive merchant 
shipping use of Hong Kong would provide complications. The Chinese will certainly 
deploy coastal forces to establish visible signs of sovereignty, as the Briti.sh did, and 
major naval units may be visitors; if only for prestige purposes. 
The PLA .will not be able to use the former RAF base at Sek Kong for major air 
operations. The runway is too short for take-off or landing of fast jets, and is suitable 
only for helicopter operations. 65 The air force component of China's future Hong Kong 
garrison was to be equipped with Shenyang J-8 Finback fighters, but the aircraft were to 
62 Ibid .. 
63 Graham Hutchings, "Hong Kong Troop Fears Unfounded," Daily Telegraph, December 4, 1996, P 15. 
64 Peter Howard, "UK Forces Poised for Hong Kong Handover as Deadline Looms," Jane's Defense 
Weekly, April 10, 1996, P 20. 
65 Ian Bruce, "Cash on the Table," Herald (Glasgow), December 7, 1996, P 12. 
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be based in adjacent Guangdong province. The unit would be headquartered in Hong 
Kong, but its fighter aircraft would operate from bases outside the SAR perhaps' at 
Huiyang or Shantou in Guangdong province. The unit could have between thirty and 
forty J-8 II Finback-B's. The Air Force component of the future Hong Kong garrison 
would probably also be equipped with a squadron of about 12 helicopters. The helicopter 
element would operate from within Hong Kong itself, possibly from the former base of 
the Royal Air Force's 28th Squadron at Sek Kong.66 
Prior to the transition, the PLA established a preparatory unit in Guangzhou that 
would become its garrison in Hong Kong when China resumes sovereignty, but it would 
be a garrison isolated by necessity from the mainstream of daily life in the city. The PLA 
soldiers, handpicked men from the north of the country, would be allowed out of their 
Jourteenbases in the territory only in tightly-controlled parties under the supervision of 
. political officers.67 
PLA chiefs said personnel would be able to speak English or Cantonese and 
would be familiar with the territory's political, legal, and economic systems.68 They 
. would also receive lessons on the Basic Law and Hong Kong life~ Senior officers would 
have overseas experience, either through serving as defense attaches or through studies in 
Western military academies. 
PLA soldiers to be stationed in Hong Kong were also being given lessons on "the 
dangers of fast women and fast money." Troops coming to the territory would undergo 
66 "Mainland Bases for PLA's Hong Kong Fighter Force," Jane's Defense Weekly, February 21, 1996, P 13. 
67 Ian Bruce, "Farewell to the Foreign Devils, p 13. 
68 Ibid. 
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"political indoctrination" courses and be warned against mixing with foreigners. Major 
General Liu was priming soldiers with a politics course called "Revolutionary Life 
Philosophy." He was also preparing a study program called "The Pursuit of Life Values 
and Revolutionary Warriors. ,,69 According to PRC officials, classes on political 
indoctrination are a normal part of training for PLA soldiers.7o They read the works of 
Deng Xiaoping and learn about discipline and loyalty to the party. The classes are 
intended to define and ensure their political correctness. 
The soldiers of the Hong Kong garrison would be barred from buying lottery 
tickets, betting on horse races, visiting nightclubs, or engaging in any commercial 
activity. They would also be banned from reading Chimi-watching magazines which 
Chinese authorities view as anti-Beijing.71 
The PLA garrison's manpower will be rotated back to the mainland on a ·regular 
basis to avoid "spiritual pollution." In .their barracks, food, entertainment, and cultural 
and political enlighteiunent will be provided free of charge and in total isolation from the 
dynamic community which will surround them. 72 
c. GARRISON LAW. 
Two issues which have a direct impact on the future autonomy of Hong Kong 
were at the forefront of the Joint Liaison Group's talks on defense and public security. 
The first is the creation of a Garrison Law. 
69 Emma Batha,"PLA Quick to Teach Against Fast Living," South China Morning Post, July 18, 1996, P 4. 
70 Ibid. 
71 John Leicester, "International News," AP Worldstream, July 17, 1996. 
72 Ian Bruce, "Farewell to the Foreign Devils," p 12. 
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Under the British.government, criminal cases to be tried in military courts were 
confined to very limited circumstances only. For example, if the alleged offense was 
against another member of the garrison, or was against the property of the UK. 
Government or other garrison members, or arose out of and in the course of his duty, the 
case was reviewed by military courts. Even under such circumstances, the normal 
practice was to hand over a case to Hong Kong courts if an offense resulted in a serious 
incident or injury to a civilian, or if there were a civilian accomplice. 
The official British government position was that this arrangement in respect to 
criminal jurisdiction should continue to apply in the future garrison law. Its view was 
that any civil cases involving the PLA garrison should be dealt with in Hong Kong 
courts. All members of the British Forces were subject to the civil jurisdiction of Hong 
Kong coUrts irrespective of whether they were acting in the course of their duties. 
The Garrison Law, which thePRC was drafting at the time of talks, would govern 
the conduct of Chinese military personnel after reversion. China's draft says that civil 
offenses committed by off-duty personnel should be dealt with by Hong Kong courts. 
Those committed by on-duty troops should fall under the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
People's Court in Beijing.73 Speaking after a meeting of the Legislative Council Panel on 
Security on the Government's Position on the Garrison and the Law after 1997, a 
spokesman for Hong Kong Security Branch officials said that greater clarity was needed 
7311ay Sin-Mi Hon, "Local Courts Should Rule on PLA Lapses," South China Morning Post, December 4, 
1996, P 4. 
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in detennining whether local courts or courts outside Hong Kong SAR should have 
jurisdiction over PLA on-duty and off-duty troops.74 
The implications of the Garrison Law for Hong Kong's autonomy were apparent. 
Who has real control over a territory can be answered in part by who sanctions criminals 
in that territory. How the conduct of the PLA was governed, and who had the authority 
to govern them, would be an important factor in detennining the level of autonomy in 
Hong Kong. 
D. TURNOVER OF DUTIES 
Discussions on the transfer of defense responsibilities had gone smoothly. The 
United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the British garrison enjoyed close 
liaison with the PLA. There had been continuous briefings, with the British encouraging 
the PLA to adopt the UK'~ practices. The MoD's objec~ive was to ensure an orderly 
transfer of power and to sustain confidence and stability to the point of the handover .. 75 
At one time, Britain hoped to persuade China not to base any troops in the 
territory after 1997, and appeared to win the consent of officials in Beijing. However, 
. they were overruled by Deng Xiaoping who said that those who suggested the PLA 
would not be sent to the territo,ry were "talking rubbish.,,76 
74 "Government's Position on Garrison and the Law," Statement from Spokesman for Hong Kong's Security 
Branch, November 11, 1996, "Hong Kong Government Information Center," [http:\\www.info.gov.hk]. 
November 30,1996.· . 
7S Ron Matthews, "Peaceful Transition Now Underway?" Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1, 1996, p. 
8. 
76 Graham Hutchings, "Beijing Says it Won't Smother Hong Kong with Troops," Vancouver Sun, 
December 3, 1996, p. A12. 
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From 1984-89 the transitional arrangements passed off smoothly. The Tiananmen 
Square incident seriously affected confidence of the British and the Hong Kong people, 
however. Since then, Sino-British dialogue had been tense and, at times, acrimonious. 
Although the atmosphere had improved in the months just prior to reversion, there was 
nevertheless foreboding on the Hong Kong side. 
As for physical turnover of property from the British troops, a total of twenty-five 
former British army, navy, and air force facilities, including barracks on Hong Kong 
Island and in Kowloon, the old Tamar naval base, the Gurkha complex at Sek Kong and 
the adjacent RAF air base in the New Territories were to be handed over to civilian 
control (the Hong Kong government) when the British garrison departed the territory. 
After seven years of negotiations, the incoming PLA agreed to· occupy fourteen 
.sites, including a new naval base being built at Hong Kong government expense on 
Stonecutter's Island, a new 120-bed hospital at Tsim Sha Tsui, warehousing and officers 
quarters at Sek Kong; and a control center at the new airport on Lantau Island. Fourteen 
British army sites were handed over to China, including the luxurious home of the 
Commander of the BritishForces, Maj. Gen: Bryan Dutton. This would become the 
residence of Maj. Gen. Liu Zhenwu who would command the PLA garrison in Hong 
Kong.77 The facilities used by the three Royal Navy vessels specially designed for Hong 
Kong waters - HMS Peacock, Plover, and Starling - were handed back to the Hong Kong 
government to become a dockyard for their vessels which number about 300.78 
77 Bruce, "Cash on the Table," p. 12. 
78 Howard, p 20. 
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In an attempt to make the transfer of personnel run smoother, China increased 
liaison between the PLA and the British garrison in Hong Kong. In July, 1996, Major 
General Liu Zhenwu paid a milestone visit to Hong Kong for talks with the Commander 
British Forces, Major General Bryan Dutton, to further the work of the Joint Liaison 
Group.79 This was the first time a high-ranking PLA official made such a visit. Major 
General Dutton said he was trying to show his Chinese successors how to behave in a . 
First World city. He explained thai Hong Kong is very different from a garrison town in 
China. Through the course of several visits by the PLA leadership Major General Dutton 
attempted to show how the British troops interface with the many aspects of Hong Kong 
life.8o 
The chief of the PLA garrison in Hong Kong was warned to be open and 
transparent about the activities of his troops. Major General Liu Zhenwu was advised by 
Major Gen. Dutton to be frank with the public because "there was plenty of scope for 
misunderstanding. ,,81 It seems that the British commander anticipated that ~here was a 
great opportunity for there to be problems between the Hong Kong people and the PLA 
troqps. 
A press report in London stated that the PLA would stage a show of force by 
marching 6,000 troops across the border into Hong Kong on July 1, 1997.82 This report 
79 Paul Beaver, "China Steps up the Chann Offensive," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1, 1996, P 9. 
80 Jonathan Manthorpe, "Chinese Coached for Hong Kong Takeover," Vancouver Sun, August 30, 1996, P 
AB. 
81 Emma Batha, and Zorian Wong, "PLA Chief Told to be Open About Troops; General Warned of Scope 
For Misunderstanding," South China Morning Post, July 19, 1996, P 8. 
82 "China Assures No Mass PLA March into Hong Kong in '97," Reuters, December 2,1996. 
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caused anxiety in Hong Kong, and the Chinese were keen to dispel such fears. Field 
Marshal Sir Peter Inge, Britain's Chief of Defense, held talks with military chiefs in 
Beijing the last week of November, 1996. He said, "I was given a very clear message 
that it was unthinkable that the PLA would march into Hong Kong in large numbers, and 
that media speCUlation in that respect was totally unfounded. I think it showed a 
sensitivity felt toward this situation. ,,83 Despite the assurances, China's leaders seemed 
sure to mark their recovery of Hong Kong which they regard as expunging of a national 
humiliation with a good deal of military fanfare. 
E. PERCEPTIONS OF THE HONG KONG PEOPLE 
Many of Hong Kong's 6.3 million people are refugees who fled the Communist 
army's takeover of China in 1949. Their dislike of the PLA was deepened by its crushing 
of pro-democracy demonstrations on Beijing's Tiananmen Square in 1989. Most of the 
. Hong Kong population, previously resigned to the resumption of Chinese sovereignty 
over the colony in 1997 saw in the events in Tiananmen Square a frightening vision of 
their own future under Beijing's rule.84 
The PLA's role is of particular concern. The Joint Declaration states that the PLA 
will not interfere in the internal affairs of the region, but the Basic Law allows the PLA's 
assistance to be sought in restoring public order and empowers Beijing to apply Chinese 
legislation to deal with a "state of emergency" in the event of "turmoil" beyond Hong 
Kong's control. Today, that is generally seen by the Hong Kong people as permission for 
another Tiananmen Square and few in Hong Kong trust the Chinese leadership. 
83 Hutchings, p A12. 
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With memories 9f the June 4, 1989, crackdown still lingering in the minds of 
many in Hong Kong, it is not surprising that a lot of people there still react with 
trepidation to anything to do with the PLA. Before the Hong Kong people can truly say . 
they respect, trust, and support the PLA, they want to know that the Chinese soldiers will 
be acting fully in accordance with the law and will not behave in a way that puts them 
above the community. Over the past decade, the Hong Kong people had hardly felt the 
presence of the British garrison in Hong Kong; the soldiers had been almost invisible. 
Peace and order were maintained by the local police force and the soldiers stayed out of 
the lives of the Hong Kong people. However, with the change of sovereignty and the 
many stories that they heard about the misconduct of some PLA soldiers on the mainland, 
it is not surprising that people were nervous.85 As discussed above, a draft law on the 
PLA garnson was in the works. Until regulations are clearly spelled out to the 
community, the Hong Kong people are likely to remain skeptical.about the role, the 
privileges, and the power to be enjoyed by Chinese soldiers. 
The PRC launched a public relations campaign to ease the fears ofthe Hong Kong 
people. Early in 1996 China invited a select audience to visit the training facility in 
adjacent Shenzhen where Hong Kong's PLA garrison was being trained. Described as 
"elite troops," Beijing offered assurances that they have no mandate to interfere in Hong 
Kong's internal affairs.86 
84 Nick Steadman, "Tiananmen Square Carnage Ends UK's Hong Kong Honeymoon," International 
Defense Review, November 1, 1989, p. 1487. 
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Xiong Ziren, political commissar of the PLA garrison based in Hong Kong, told 
the China-backed Wen Wei Po daily that "no matter what changes have taken place, the 
People's Liberation Army will wholeheartedly serve the people, including the compatriots 
of Hong Kong." He said the PLA principle and practice of serving the people "was the 
same in the past, it is still the same now, and in the future it will forever remain the 
same.,,87 
The public relations campaign continued with Major General Liu's visits to Hong 
Kong to meet with his British counterpart, Major General Dutton. During his first visit to 
Hong Kong on July 16, Liu tried to calm public fears about the PLA forces to be 
stationed in the territory. He said the troops, who were then being trained in southern 
China, would act in a civilized fashion. 88 Gen. Dutton described members of the garrison 
as the elite of the Chinese ~y. British military sources said they hoped Gen Liu's visit 
would help calm fears about the future role of the PLA in Hong Kong by showing its 
commanders how British forces operate in the territory.89 PLA leaders seemed to be very 
e~ger to put the Hong Kong people's minds at ease. They were cooperating with their 
. British counterparts to ensure a smooth transition, and they were making sure that the 
Hong Kong people were aware of these efforts. Historically the Chinese have not 
cooperated with the British in this manner. In this case, however, there is an obvious, 
87 "Chinese Military Vows to Serve the People of Hong Kong After 1997," Agence Pre sse France, August 
12, 1996. 
88 "Chinese Army Chief to Meet Hong Kong Police, Security Officials," Agence France Presse, August 14, 
1996. 
89 Graham Hutchings, "Hong Kong Welcomes its General from China," Daily Telegraph, July 17, 1996, p. 
13. 
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deliberate effort by the Chinese government to attempt to relive any fears the Hong Kong 
people may have regarding the placement ofPLA troops in Hong Kong. 
F. CONCLUSIONS: POST-REVERSION PROSPECTS 
With the establishment of the Hong Kong SAR, the British garrison was 
withdrawn and the Central People's Government of the PRC is now responsible for the 
SAR's defense. Will Hong Kong maintain its "high degree of autonomy" in the security 
arena? The Joint Declaration promises that Hong Kong's way of life will remain 
unchanged for 50 years. Does that include security matters? The Joint Declaration states 
that the PLA will not interfere in the internal affairs of the SAR. This section of the Joint 
Declaration makes clear that the maintenance of public order in the SAR will be the SAR 
Government's responsibility. It is also states that military forces sent by the Central 
. . 
People's Government to be stationed in the SAR for the purpose of defense will not 
interfere in its internal affairs, and iliat the expenditure for these military forces will be 
borne by the Central People's Government. Although the Basic Law reiterates this, it 
includes a clause which empowers the PRC to apply Chinese laws to deal with a "state of 
emergency" or "turmoil" beYO:nd the control of the Hong Kong government. The possible. 
implementation of this "turmoil" clause is vital to the degree of autonomy Hong Kong can 
maintain. Essentially, Beijing has control over Hong Kong's security, internal and 
external, no matter what the Joint Declaration says: Whether or not Beijing takes 
advantage of this opportunity to control the internal security of Hong Kong will say a lot 
about' the autonomy of Hong Kong as a whole. 
Since the signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984, both Hong Kong and China 
had been preparing for the transition with each side attempting to carve out its niche in' 
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the realm of security of the Hong Kong SAR. As the British garrison downsized over the 
years, the Hong Kong government had assumed more and more of the functions and 
responsibilities previously performed by the British troops. This left fewer duties for the 
PLA to turn over from the British and enabled the local government a greater sense of 
autonomy in the security of Hong Kong. There will still be a border with China, still a 
need for customs and immigration controls and Hong Kong will still be responsible for 
internal security through its police force. 
Prior to reversion, the PLA, on the other hand, was well into its training program 
for its future Hong Kong garrison. In fact, they began sending an advance party across 
the border in January, 1997. The PRC had been negotiating an increasing role of these 
PLA troops in the JLG meetings on security and defens.e. A Garrison Law which would 
govern the conduct of Chine~e military ·personnel in Hong Kong was also in heated 
negotiations. The resolution of these issues will provide an indication of the f?ture 
security autonomy in Hong Kong. Beijing's commitments to Hong Kong's autonomy in 
the security realm sound very promising. However, the true test of autonomy will come 
. when and if the PRC enacts the "turmoil" clause ofthe Basic Law. 
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IV. THE ECONOMIC ARENA 
While the prospect of autonomy in the political arena does not seem promising 
and the issue of autonomy in security is still to be tested, the future of economic 
autonomy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is much more concrete. This 
chapter will discuss Hong Kong's future autonomy in the economic arena. First, it will 
examine Hong Kong's economic system before reversion and the reasons behind its 
phenomenal success. Next, it will explain the interests of the United States and China, 
respectively, in the future stability of that system. Then, it will discuss the promises set 
forth in the Joint Declaration and Basic Law which deal specifically with economic 
issues. FInally, it will provide an analysis 6fthe transition process thus far followed by a 
discussion of the prospects ofthe Hong Kong economy post-reversion. 
A. HONG KONG'S ECONOMY TODAY 
By almost any standard, Hong Kong has one of the world's most successful 
.economies. ~ong Kong is totally integrated into the global service economy. Hong 
Kong is the world's fifth largest banking center for external financial transactions, fifth 
largest foreign exchange market, seventh largest stock market, eighth largest trading 
entity, and the world's busiest container port.90 According to Donald Tsang, Hong 
90 "Hong Kong Center for International Business: The 1997 Budget," [http//:www.info.gov.hk/fblbdgt97]. 
March 12, 1997. 
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Kong's Financial Secretary, "Hong Kong is already the best place in the world in which 
to do business, and the Government is totally committed to ensuring that it remains so. ,,91 
The Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom consistently cites Hong 
Kong as the world's freest economy. There is little government interference in the 
marketplace; taxes are low and predictable; increases in government spending are linked 
closely to economic growth; foreign trade is free; and regulations, in addition to being 
transparent, are applied both uniformly and consistently. The top tax rate is 15 percent, 
and only 40 percent of the people pay it. 92' Free enterprise has given Hong Kong the 
highest per capita income in the world. It has a balanced budget, and it has had that for 
30 years.93 
The Hong Kong government makes a vital but deliberately limited contribution to 
Hong Kong's economic success. There has long been a clear understanding between the 
government and the business community that business decisions are best left to 
entrepreneurs and investors, and 'Hong Kong has enjoyed an exceptional record of 
sustained economic expansion.94 
Minimum interference and maximum support from the government has created . 
the most entrepreneurial environment in Asia, if not the world. Government spending 
follows, and does not outpace, economic growth. Public expenditure is kept at under 
91 Ibid. 
92 Press Conference with House Speaker Newt Gingrich, Representative John Dingell, and Other Members 
of the Congressional Delegation Which Traveled to Asia, Federal News Service, April 9, 1997. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Donald Tsang, "Hong Kong 1997 Economic Outlook," 
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twenty percent of GDP .. Hong Kong has had a budget surplus year after year, and fiscal 
reserves stand at over $19 billion.95 Hong Kong has a stable currency linked to the US 
dollar. This link provides the monetary discipline for the government and the private. 
sector to maintain flexibility and competitiveness. 
B. U.S. INTEREST 
The United States has a very significant stake in promoting economic and 
business relationships with Hong Kong. Hong Kong is an international city. Its future 
stability and continued prosperity are important not just to China but to the entire world 
community. The United States has a major interest in Hong Kong's successful transition. 
U.S. trade, investment, and business with Hong Kong have in recent years flourished in a 
virtually barrier-free environment. Hong Kong is an excellent market for US exports. 
1996 exports to Hong Kong, many of which are re-exported to China, totaled nearly $15 
billion.96 Hong Kong is the destination of $14 billion in foreign direct investment from 
the United States.97 Some 1,000 resident U.S. firms employ 250,000 Hong Kong 
workers, and about 37,000 American citizens live and work in Hong Kong.98 Hong Kong 
is the home of the largest overseas American Chamber ofCommerce.99 
95 Christopher Patten, Speech at the opening of the International Monetary Fund Conference on Financial 
Integration in Asia and the Role of Hong Kong, "Hong Kong Government Information Center," 
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Hong Kong has sent ambassadors of goodwill to the United States to foster good 
economic and trade relations between the two places. Hong Kong's Economic and Trade 
Offices in Washington, San Francisco, and New York are not embassies or consulates. 
Their nature and establishment are described in Article 156 of the Basic Law, and they 
are part and parcel of Hong Kong's commercial autonomy. Together with the overseas 
offices of the Tourist Association, the Trade Development Council and the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority in the U.S., the mission of the three ETOs is to continue to work 
with a single objective of strengthening the Hong Kong and U.S. economic and trading 
ties in the years to come following the reversion. 100 
The bottom line is that the United States wanted to continue to enjoy the same 
broad range of relations with Hong Kong after the reversion to Chinese sovereignty. 
C. CHINA'S INTEREST 
The concept of economic autonomy within China is not new. In 1978 the Chinese 
Communist Party committed the nation to gradualistic market reforms as part of the 
"Four Modernizations". Initial changes laid the foundation for establishing Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) which opened China to outside economic influences. These 
. selected ports have relaxed rules and foreigners are allowed to operate there. In 1979 a 
law establishing ground rules for joint ventures was passed, and in 1980 four cities were 
selected to be SEZs, all along the southeastern coast, including Shenzen adjacent to Hong 
Kong. Restrictive rules on economic activities were relaxed, and foreign trade was 
encouraged in these areas. Since then foreign investment has poured in, exports have 
100 Ibid. 
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poured out, and these cities have boomed. The SEZs have become engines of growth and 
outward expansion. 
China has a vested interest in the successful transition of Hong Kong partly 
because the territory is the dynamo for its own economy. In addition to accumulated 
Hong Kong investment of almost $70 billion in China,· Hong Kong provides a source of 
technical expertise in economic and financial management. 101 
For decades, a handful of Chinese companies have done business in Hong Kong: 
the Bank of China, China Resources, China Travel, China Merchants; companies that 
served as Beijing's pipelines to the global economy. However, in the last decade, and 
particularly in the last five years, Chinese companies, including many businesses tied to 
the Chinese government, have flooded Hong Kong, buying property, wooing foreign deal 
makers, and looking for capital,. Richard Wong, the director of the Center for Economic 
Research at Hong Kong University, estimates that the vast percentage of Chinese 
companies in Hong Kong are busily transferring assets from China to the tune of $65 
billion annually a sum which is equal to more than half of China's total foreign 
reserves. 102 
The Bank of China, ?eijing's most formidable presence in Hong Kong, has 
become a principal banking institution there. . According to banking analysts, it has 
corralled about a quarter of Hong Kong's retail banking market and is one of three banks 
101 John Ridding, "Summers Warns China on Hong Kong," Financial Times, March 4, 1997, p. 4. 
102 Edward A. Gargan, "China Already Entrenched As a Hong Kong Capitalist," New York Times, 
December 5,1996, p. AI. 
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permitted to issue Hong Kong currency.l03 The bank also handles a major share of 
corporate lending, in large measure because of the bank's access and power on the 
mainland. Since the bank is not listed on the stock exchange and releases little 
information about its activities, little is known about its clients, deals, and profitability. 
However, it does serve as the parent institution for eleven smaller banks in Hong Kong 
and for investment holding companies. 
Evading China's capricious bureaucracy and its lack of an effective legal and 
financial system is one of the core reasons Chinese companies, provinces, towns, and 
ministries have established a presence in Hong Kong. They also received the 
considerable benefit of being transformed into "foreign investors" in China. China offers 
very lucrative incentives to foreign investors that are not available to local companies. A 
·lot of Chinese companies that wanted. to make investments in China set up ·a shell 
company in Hong Kong and shifted mqney outside of China. They then used the shell 
company as a cover for foreign investment to send money back to China. 1 04 
China's links to the Hong Kong economy have been a vital factor in China's 
economic success. Hong Kong's status as a .Special Administrative Region will cre.ate 
new trade and investment opportunities as the modernization process continues to 
transform the Chinese economy. 
D. PROMISES OF THE JOINT DECLARATION AND BASIC LAW 
Where the Joint Declaration and Basic Law were vague in describing how Hong 
Kong would maintain its autonomy in the areas of politics and security, the two 
103 Ibid. 
104 Wei Li, Professor of Managerial Economics at Duke University, as quoted in Gargan. 
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documents are very specific when it comes to economic issues. The Joint Declaration 
provides for the Hong Kong SAR to have autonomy in economic, financial, and 
monetary fields. According to this document, there will be no exchange control and the 
Hong Kong dollar will continue to be freely convertible. Investors will be able to put in 
or withdraw their capital freely. The Hong Kong SAR government will use its own 
revenues exclusively for its own purposes, and the PRC will not levy taxes in the Special 
Administrative Region. 
The Joint Declaration and Basic Law provide for continuity In that the 
Government of the Hong Kong SAR will determine its own fiscal policy and manage and 
dispose of its financial resources, to include drawing up its own budgets and final 
accounts, in accordance with Hong Kong's own needs. There is no requirement to remit 
revenue to the Central People's Govemrrient. 105 
The Joint Declaration also addresses specifically the Hong Kong economic 
system and external economic relations, which are both important for H<?ng Kong's 
export-oriented economy. Hong Kong's prosperity is heavily dependent on securing 
continued access. to its principal export markets in the developed world. The Joint 
Declaration provides reassurance both to the community at large in Hong Kong and to its 
trading partners that the basis for Hong Kong's flourishing free market economy will 
continue. The Joint Declaration also provides for Hong Kong's right to continue to 
determine its economic policies, includi~g trade policy, in accordance with its own needs. 
It also provides for the continuation of the free enterprise system, the :free trade policies 
and :free port, which are the essentials of Hong Kong's consistent and successful 
105 "Joint Declaration," Annex I, Section V and "Basic Law," Chapter V, Section 1, Article 106. 
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economic policies. Further, it provides for the continuation of individual rights and 
freedoms in economic matters, notably the freedoms of choice of occupation, of travel, 
and of movement of capital, and the rights of individuals and companies to own and 
dispose of property. 106 The Basic Law echoes these promises. Article 109 of the Basic 
Law states that the Government of the Hong Kong SAR shall provide· an "appropriate and 
legal environment for the maintenance of the status of Hong Kong as an international 
financial center."I07 
Hong Kong's monetary system is based on a freely convertible currency and the 
right to manage the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, which provides the backing for the 
note issue, is used to regulate the exchange value of the currency. The Joint Declaration 
stipulates that these essential elements shall be maintained. Section VII of Annex I of the 
Joint DeClaration states, "The Hong Kong SAR shall retain the status of an international 
. financial center. The monetary and financial systems previously practiced in Hong Kong, 
including the systems of regulation and supervision of deposit taking institutions and 
financial markets, shall be maintained." The Hong Kong SAR Government may decide 
.its monetary and financial policies on its own. According to the Joint Declaration, it will 
safeguard the free operation of financial business and the free flow of capital within, into, 
and out of the Hong Kong SAR. The Hong Kong dollar, as the local legal tender, will 
continue to circulate and remain freely convertible. The authority to issue Hong Kong 
106 "Joint Declaration," Annex I, Section VI. 
107 "Basic Law," Chapter V, Section 1, Article 109. 
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currency will be vested in the Hong Kong SAR Government. Again, these promises are 
repeated specifically in the Basic Law. 108 
E. THE TRANSITION 
Chinese authorities took many steps to smooth the transition and retain Hong 
Kong's capitalist status. In a speech to the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong 
Kong, Lawrence Summers, U.S. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, said that China had 
much to gain and to learn from Hong Kong when the territory reverted to Chinese 
sovereignty, but he stressed that it was important that the two maintain their separate 
economic systems. "It is essential that China allows Hong Kong to be Hong Kong. If 
there is to be some convergence over time, it would be beneficial for all involved if 
China's system became more like Hong Kong's than the other way around. ,,109 
If the J oint Decla~ation was carried out, Hong Kong was supposed to retain its 
autonomy in economic affairs, including its independent fiscal.and monetary policy. 
Hong Kong was supposed to retain its status as an international financial center, with its 
own currency separate from China's renminbi. Hong Kong was to continue to be a key 
member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and retain 
membership in major international financial institutions. 
In his speech, Summers warned Beijing that mishandling of Hong Kong's 
transition to Chinese sovereignty would deal a severe blow to its own interest as well as 
to the territory's economy. "If it encroaches or is perceived to encroach upon Hong 
108 "Basic Law," Chapter V, Section 1, Articles 110, 111, and 112. 
\09 "USIS - China Has Much to Gain, Learn From Hong Kong," Speech by Lawrence Summers, US 
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, March 3, 1997, Asia Pulse, Release by the US Information Service, 
March 10, 1997. 
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Kong's autonomy, the Hong Kong people have the ability to make such actions 
extremely costly - either by leaving Hong Kong or by transferring funds. Such changes 
could be disastrous for the Hong Kong economy, but the loss to China would be 
immense. ,,110 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
Hong Kong is an important international financial, trade, shipping, tourism, and 
information center in the Asia-PaCific region. A smooth handover of Hong Kong with 
China honoring all its commitments would have benefited not only the Chinese economy 
but also enhance China's stature in the international community. 
According to the Joint Declaration and Basic Law, Hong Kong is to be permitted 
to maintain the status quo for fifty years and enjoy a high degree of autonomy provided 
this ,continues to be seen by the Chinese ,Communist leadership as economically 
beneficial and' not harmful to its claim of sovereignty over the territory. The key 
question, of course, is whether China will honor its impressive set of corrlII~.itments. It 
should be recognized that the real purpose of the "one country, two systems" formula is 
to serve the inte~ests of the PRC. Capitalist Hong Kong will enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy ifit enhances the interests of the system in China. 
On the economic side, in general, Chinese statements and actions have been 
reassuring about China's commitment to Hong Kong's future prosperity' and preservation 
of its dynamic capitalist system. Over the years Chinese businesses have set up 
operations in Hong Kong, and China's government has allowed this to happen. Many of 
these businesses, in fact, have direct ties to the government. China's government has 
110 Ibid, 
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made clear its intention to maintain Hong Kong's own currency linked to the U.S. dollar 
and to preserve Hong Kong's substantial foreign exchange reserves. PRC companies so 
far seem interested in gaining a share of the lucrative contracts tendered in Hong Kong 
rather than undermining the process itself. 
Hong Kong's economy remains healthy and strong. Most Hong Kong 
businessmen view the future positively and are less concerned with the uncertainties over 
political arrangements. III 
Beijing has ample reasons to live up t6 its commitments since no country has 
benefited more from Hong Kong's success than China itself. Hong Kong is China's 
largest trading partner and much of China's two-way trade uses Hong Kong as a trans-
shipment point. Sixty-five percent of foreign direct investment in China now comes from 
or through Hong Kong. Ov.er ?O,OOO enteiprises in Guangdong Province alone use HO]1g 
Kong investment and employ over 4 million PRC workers. 112 
China has relied on Hong Kong's easy access to investment capital, sophisticated 
financial, technical and legal expertise, and entrepreneurial skills to fuel its own 
economic growth. over the last two decades. Beijing knows that Hong Kong'~ vibrant 
service economy could dissip?-te quickly through steady or mass emigration if its signals 
111 "Hong Kong Businessmen Prepare for Chinese Rule," Cable News Network Transcript # 924-6, July 31, 
1996. ' 
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or actions erode confidence. Thus, Beijing has a real interest in making its stewardship 
of Hong Kong a success. 
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V.CONCLUSION 
The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, signed in 
1984, calls for maintaining Hong Kong's lifestyle and "high degree of autonomy" for fifty 
years after the establishment of the post-reversion Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region. The primary research question that this thesis attempted to answer is: How has 
the concept of "high degree pf autonomy" been operationalized since its inception in the 
"Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question 
of Hong Kong?" Both the British (Hong Kong) government and the Chinese government 
had different interpretations of the concept of Hong Kong's "high degree of autonomy. " 
-Events which took place over the thirteen years since the signing of the Joint Declaration 
to the handover show how each side interpreted and politicized the notion of autonomy in 
Hong Kong. This thesis tracked changes since 1984 and explained where the PRC and 
Hong Kong stood on the issues just prior to reversion. 
The political arena saw the most activity in the period leading up to reversion. 
Through democratic reforms during the final years of British rule, Hong Kong in effect, 
transferred some political power from the British colonial government to the people of 
Hong Kong. The government of the PRC reacted negatively to these changes and revised 
the entire political system after reversion. 
Prior to reversion Governor Patten had the support of the colony's liberals who 
wanted Britain to push China harder to see if more democratic reform might allow Hong 
Kong to safeguard its political autonoII,lY. Patten pushed China extremely hard, but failed 
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to get any major concessions. In providing greater political reform, Patten tried to 
institutionalize democratic mechanisms to protect post-reversion Hong Kong's 
autonomy, despite Chinese assurances that if he went ahead unilaterally, whatever 
institution he set up would not last beyond June 30, 1997. 
Not surprisingly, China set up a Provisional Legislative Council in January, 1996 
despite a virtual consensus in the Hong Kong legal community, including both the Hong 
Kong Bar Association and the Law Society, that this provisional body lacked a legal 
basis. China circumvented the Basic Law by calling the legislative body instated on July 
1, 1997, a "Provisional Legislature" rather than the "First Legislature" of the Hong Kong 
SAR. 
This represented a step backward for Hong Kong's democratic reform. This 
, ' 
represented China's attempt to ensure that Hong Kong would not run astray. The 
creation of the Provisional Legislative Council, whose members were hand-picked 
Beijing supporters, to replace the popularly elected legislature formed in the last days of 
British rule, was the most serious violation of the Basic Law. Beijing defended this 
violation, saying that as China and Britain could not arrive at a mutually acceptable way, 
of constituting the first post-handover legislature, it was forced to abandon the legislature 
constituted under British tutelage. 
Beijing also devised for the SAR an extremely complicated election system to 
ensure that the largest party in Hong Kong, the Democratic Party, which was also the 
most' critical of Beijing, could never enjoy majority status in the legislature. According to 
the Basic Law, the post-handover legislature consisted of twenty seats from geographic 
wards, thirty from functional constituencies, representing business and professionals, and 
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ten from an electoral cqllege of 800 members known for their pro-Beijing inclinations. 
By introducing proportional representation and multi-member geographic constituencies, 
and eliminating mass-membership functional constituencies in favor of narrowly defined, . 
limited-membership fullctional wards, the PRC reined in the reforms made in the last 
years of British rule that had made the legislature more democratic and representative of 
the people as a whole. As a result of these changes, the popular Democratic Party and 
other pro-democracy independents were restricted to a smaller proportion of legislative 
seats than they had won in the 1995 election. 
The nomination process for the Chief Executive was structured to ensure that 
Beijing was not presented with a candidate it could not accept. China's 150-member 
Preparatory Committee was responsible for establishing the 400-member Selection 
Committee which, in tum, chose the Chief Executive. Of the.150 members, mainland 
representatives constituted over a third, while the rest were Hong Kong members who 
were mostly business leaders and pro-Beijing political figures. This ensured the 
Selection Committee was composed oflike-minded pro-Beijing members. 
One year after reversion the political arena has seen more change. The 
Provisional Legislature was to last only one year, and China has lived up to that promise. 
Legislative elections in May 1998, the first under Chinese rule, allowed Hong Kong 
democracy to move one step forward. One third of the sixty.seats in the legislature were 
elected through universal suffrage in that election. The rest are appointed by business 
and other special-interest groups, a process that guarantees the legislature will stay 
packed with a pro-Beijing elite. The Basic Law provides for a gradual increase of 
directly elected seats in future elections and full democracy in 2008. 
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In the recent elections for those twenty seats in the Legislative Council, voter 
turnout was unexpectedly high. The voters, moreover, gave pro-democracy candidates a 
resounding victory. In the elections the Democratic Party won 60 percent of the vote 
even though they could only compete. for one-third of the legislature's seats. The 
Democratic Party is calling for the entire body and the Chief Executive to face popular 
election much more quickly. 
The world was impressed with the record turnout at Hong Kong's May elections. 
The results were widely considered a mandate for more democracy, not less, and faster, 
not slower, strides toward political freedom. 
By contrast, the security arena has remained much quieter. According to the Joint 
Declaration and the Basic Law, the PLA is not to take a role in the internal security of 
Hong Kong. In this case, prior to reversion the local Hong Kong government managed to 
limit Beijing's control. There is, however, a clause in the Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
SAR which allows the PLA to gain control of internal affairs in the event of "turmoil" 
which "endangers national unity or security." 
When TV footage of truck load$ of PLA troops flooding across the border during 
last year's historic handover was broadcast around the world, many people worried that 
they were witnessing the beginning of the end for Hong Kong. In reality, the PLA have 
rarely been seen since in Hong Kong. They stay in their garrisons. Public order in Hong 
Kong is maintained not by the PLA, but by the same police and law enforcement 
agencies.that carried out those responsibilities before the transition. 
Since reversion, the PLA garrison, the ultimate symbol of Chinese authority over 
Hong Kong, has kept a low profile. The troops moved quietly into their barracks in Hong 
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Kong, and have remained out of sight since last July. It is still to be seen whether China 
will enact the "turmoil clause" of the Basic Law to use the PLA to take control of Hong 
Kong if Beijing feels things are getting out of hand. 
While the prospect of autonomy in the political arena does not seem promising 
and the issue of security autonomy is still to be tested, the future of economic autonomy 
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is much more concrete. 
On the economic side, in general, Chinese statements and actions have been 
reassuring about China's commitment to Hong Kong's future prosperity and preservation 
of its dynamic capitalist system. Prior to reversion, PRC businesses set up operations in 
Hong Kong, and China's government allowed this to happen. Many of these businesses, 
in fact, have direct ties to the mainland government. China's government has made clear 
. its intention to maintain Hong Kong's .own currency linked to the U.S. dollar and to 
preserve Hong Kong's substantial foreign exchange reserVes. PRC companies so far 
seem interested in gaining a share of the lucrative contracts tendered in Hong Kong rather 
than undermining the process itself. The PRC will not try to infringe upon economic 
autonomy because it is in China's best interyst for Hong Kong to maintain its current 
economic success. 
Beijing has ample reasons to live up to its commitments since no country has 
benefited more from Hong Kong's success than China itself. Hong Kong is China's 
largest trading partner and much of China's two-way trade uses Hong Kong as a trans-
shipment point. China has relied on Hong Kong's easy access to investment capital, 
sophisticated financial, technical and legal expertise, and entrepreneurial skills to fuel its 
own economic growth over the last two decades. Beijing knows that if its signals or 
65 
actions erode confidenc~, Hong Kong's vibrant service economy could dissipate quickly 
through steady or mass emigration. Thus, Beijing has a real interest in making its 
stewardship of Hong Kong economy a success". 
Hong Kong's position as an international financial, trading and shipping center 
and free port has been safeguarded. Soon after the establishment of the Hong Kong SAR, 
Asia experienced a financial crisis and the strong and extensive impact it had on Hong 
Kong was the most extraordinary in a long time. With the support of the central 
government, the SAR government took effective and appropriate measures to secure the 
system of pegging the Hong Kong dollar to the U.S. dollar and thereby maintaining an 
overall financial and economic stability. 
When the Asian financial crisis fiercely buffeted Hong Kong, the central 
governnient's decision not" to devalue the renminbi was a strong backing for Hong 
Kong's currency pegging system arid strong economy. Most foreign companies in Hong 
Kong continue to show confidence in Hong Kong's investment environment. They see 
Hong Kong as a bridge to access the mainland market and are willing to invest in Hong 
Kong on a long-term basis. 
The territory's first year under Chinese rule is ending less than auspiciously, with 
rising unemployment, shrinking economic growth and a volatile stock market amid the 
Asian financial crisis. However, Hong Kong's economic downturn is not the result of the 
handover. If anything, Britain created the overheating of the Hong Kong economy on the 
eve of the turnover. Real estate comprises a vast percentage of the earnings of the 
companies on the Hong Kong stock exchange. Prior to reversion, the British government 
ensured that real estate would have an inflated value due to tight restraints on 
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construction and development until months before the handover. At that time the market 
started to flood with new development sites and high rise building projects. This was a 
bubble that was bound to deflate, and China's policies had little effect in preventing this. 
A year ago, there was much talk about Hong Kong playing a major role in 
buttressing China's economy. At the moment, however, it is Beijing that seems to have 
assumed the role of trying to protect the Hong Kong dollar. This means Hong Kong will 
be integrated more than ever with China economically. 
One of the factors that has not changed since reversion is the involvement of the 
United States in Hong Kong both officially and in the private sector. The United States 
has a very significant stake in promoting economic and business relationships, preserving 
civil liberties and the rule of law, maintaining a cooperative law enforcement 
.relationship, and preserving access to Hong Kong as a routine and frequent port of call 
. for U.S. Navy ships. The United States wants toenjoy the same broad range of relations 
with Hong Kong as it did before reversion. The U.S. continues to be the SAR's second 
largest trading partner, while the American expatriate community, numbering close to 
50,000, has doubled in the last five years and represents the largest non-Asian contingent 
of foreign nationals. Hong Kong is still home to the largest U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
outside North America, and so far there have been no signs of an exodus by the 1,000 
U.S. firms operating there. 
Moreover, new U.S. companies are starting up and school enrollments of 
American children have remained steady. Trade, travel, education and cultural 
exchanges, law enforcement cooperation and naval visits all retain their pre-reversion 
vitality. All the indicators of U.S. involvement remain stable. 
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The relatively smooth handover is one reason the U.S. government has felt 
comfortable in continuing its engagement with China's leaders. Had Beijing decided to 
crack the whip in the former colony, congressional opposition to President Clinton's 
quest for a strategic partnership with China would have been even more intense. 
How China handles Hong Kong post-reversion is critical to the future of Taiwan, 
to China's international standing, and to China's relations with the United ~tates. 
Conversely, mishandling post-reversion Hong Kong would endanger China's relationship 
with Taiwan, the region, and the broader international community. Preserving key 
elements of Hong Kong society, such as the rule of law, and independent civil service 
and judiciary, respect for civil liberties, a free press, is essential to Hong Kong's future. 
The formula Hone country, two systems" was first devised by Deng Xiaoping not for 
. . 
. Hong Kong, but .for Taiwan. In the eyes of the Chinese leadership, if the formula works 
in Hong Kong, that would strengthen the attraction to the people of Taiwan. If China's 
conduct in Hong Kong is revealed to be a fraud, then hopes of a peaceful reunification 
with Taiwan would be destroyed. 
Fears of China in the West and the rest of Asia would also intensify. That, in. 
tum, would increase hostility toward China, which is already finding that some of its 
international ambitions, such as membership in the World Trade Organization and 
playing host to the Olympic Games, have been thwarted by foreigners' suspicion of it. 
Suspicion would tum to outright animosity if it cracked down on Hong Kong. 
So far, the Beijing government has shown great trust in and support for the SAR 
government headed by Tung Chee-hwa. The Chinese government says it is firm about 
implementing the policy of "one country, two systems" and "Hong Kong people 
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governing Hong Kong" with a high degree of autonomy. The PRC regards this to be a 
long-term basic national policy. Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa says that 
the central. Chinese government has not interfered with the internal affairs of Hong Kong. 
Relations between Hong Kong and the mainland have further evolved. Bilateral 
exchanges in the fields of finance, science and technology, education, culture and tourism 
have been more frequent and extensive. The "one country, two systems" concept appears 
to have fared well, with China carefully refraining from jeopardizing it. Beijing has done 
well in resisting temptation to 'intervene in the territory's affairs. Many Hong Kong 
watchers feel that the year-long experience proves that Beijing meant what it said. The 
record since reversion has bolstered confidence in both the local and international 
community that China's leaders intend to keep their commitment to allow Hong Kong to 
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